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Abstract 
The field of language evolution has recently made Gricean pragmatics central to its 
task, particularly within comparative studies between human and non-human 
primate communication. The standard model of Gricean communication requires a 
set of complex cognitive abilities, such as belief attribution and understanding nested 
higher-order mental states. On this model, non-human primate communication is 
then of a radically different kind to ours. Moreover, the cognitive demands in the 
standard view are also too high for human infants, who nevertheless do engage in 
communication. In this paper I critically assess the standard view and contrast it 
with an alternative, minimal model of Gricean communication recently advanced by 
Richard Moore. I then raise two objections to the minimal model. The upshot is that 
this model is conceptually unstable and fails to constitute a suitable alternative as a 
middle ground between full-fledged human communication and simpler forms of 
non-human animal communication.   
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Introduction 
Primatologist Frans de Waal has argued throughout his career that for any ability put 
forward as uniquely and exceptionally human, there is at least one species, and often 
several, that display this same ability. This goes for tool-use, social dominance 
alliances, empathy and fairness, and the transmission of habits and learned skills 
through generations (De Waal 2016; 2013). But even De Waal acknowledges that 
human language does set us apart: 
 
“We honestly have no evidence for symbolic communication, equally 
rich and multifunctional as ours, outside our species.” (De Waal 2016, p. 
106) 
 
Current research in language evolution is thus concerned with the question: what 
makes human communication different from communication in other species, and 
how did it evolve? One current approach taken by several leading theorists to help 
tackle this question is the Gricean pragmatics approach to communication. On this 
view, part of the task of an evolutionary theory resides in explaining the emergence 
of the cognitive abilities that support a Gricean communication model of human 
language. Comparative studies between human and non-human primate 
communication can shed light on this evolutionary story. 
The core notion for pragmatics, first advanced by Paul Grice, is that human 
communication involves the expression and recognition of intentions (Grice 1959, 
1969, 1975; Bach & Harnish 1979; Sperber & Wilson 1995). In this paper I will 
concentrate on the role of this special kind of Gricean communicative intention in 
the phylogeny of language. One pervasive view is that non-human primates are 
incapable of entertaining communicative intentions (Tomasello et al., 2005; Hurford, 
2007; Bar-On, 2013; Scott-Phillips, 2014, 2015, 2016). This can be termed the strong 
view of Gricean communication. A different, minimal view allows for the possibility 
of a weaker form of Gricean communication, in which non-human primates are 
capable of engaging (Gómez 2007; Moore 2015, 2017; Townsend et al. 2016). In the 
first section I will review Scott-Phillips’ (2014, 2015) position, as exemplary of the 
strong view of Gricean communication in the language evolution literature. I will 
Lucas Battich 
72 
 
identify three related theses or assumptions that ground the strong view. This will 
help to clarify the points with which a minimal view of Gricean communication 
disagrees. 
 I will then examine the feasibility of a weaker model, as expounded in the work of 
Richard Moore (2015, 2016). Finally, I raise two objections for the minimal model of 
Gricean communication. The upshot is that the weak model is unstable. One the 
one hand, it collapses into non-Gricean forms of communication, and on the other 
hand it does not fully explain how it can support the development of a stronger 
Gricean model. 
 
Standard interpretation of Gricean communication 
In order to best consider the merits of the strong and minimal views of Gricean 
communication, is it helpful to contrast them, as Scott-Phillips himself does, with a 
third model of communication, usually termed the code model (Sperber & Wilson 
1995, p. 3-15). In the code model, communication occurs when a sender encodes a 
message according to the rules of a shared code and sends it to the receiver, who 
then decodes the message. A defining feature of the code model is that of a twofold 
association. First, signallers associate certain states of the world with a particular 
signal. Second, receivers associate such signal with a particular behaviour (Scott-
Phillips 2014, p. 21). It should be noted that a code-based model of communication 
may simply involve manipulative behaviours that impose little or no cognitive 
demands at all. Honeybee communication, for example, can be explained on this 
model. Upon returning to the hive, scout bees perform a waggle dance that can 
encode information about the direction, distance, and odour of the food, which 
forager bees then successfully decode in order to locate the food source. 
As noted in the introduction, in the Gricean model communication is 
achieved not by the transmission of information and association of the linguistic 
code, but rather by the expression and inferences of intentions. The pragmatic or 
Gricean model starts from the fact that in human communication the meaning of an 
utterance is underdetermined by the syntactic and semantic rules of the language. For 
example, in saying the sentence “Thank you” I can express gratitude, or I could 
show disdain at your action, or annoyance. Even the degree of gratitude that I am 
expressing, and that I intend you infer, can vary widely depending of factors outside 
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the literal sentence “Thank you”. This feature of human communication is widely 
known as the linguistic underdeterminacy thesis (Huang 2014, p. 7).  
 
It highlights the gap between the literal meaning of a sentence and the proposition 
intended to be communicated by uttering said sentence. This gap cannot be filled by 
attending to the meaning of words alone, but, according to Gricean pragmatics, by 
attending to the intentions of the speaker. 
Here I adopt a version of the Gricean model which slightly departs from 
Grice’s original, after the refinements and modifications by Neale (1992), and 
Sperber and Wilson (1995, 2002), but which is largely taken as a starting point for 
the strong/minimal debate (Scott-Phillips 2014; Moore 2017). For a speaker S to 
mean something by uttering (or gesturing) x the Gricean model requires that, by 
uttering x: 
 
(1) S intends to induce a response r in hearer H 
(2) S intends that H recognizes that S has intention (1) 
(3) S does not aim to deceive H regarding (1) and (2)2 
 
Mainly following the work of Sperber and Wilson (1995), intention (1) has also been 
termed informative intention, and intention (2) communicative intention. For ease of 
exposition I will follow this convention, although it is necessary to be aware that 
these are defined technical terms, and can be somewhat misleading. In using the 
term informative intention, it should be noted that the communicative act may not be 
one of informing. Grice (1982) already was aware that though his exposition used 
indicative informative intentions as examples, this did not preclude intentions other 
than informative. 3 This is an important point, to which I will come back later when 
assessing the minimal Gricean model. 
As Scott-Phillips (2014, p. 26) puts it, an informative intention (clause 1) is 
the intention that the audience recognizes what one wants to communicate. Yet this 
 
2 This formulation of the third clause is from Neale (1992), supplanting Grice’s original formulation 
after several criticisms (e.g. Strawson 1964). The nuances of this clause will not concern us here. In 
what follows it will be assumed that S is acting with honest intent, and that clauses (1) and (2) suffice 
for Gricean communication. 
3 In fact, for Grice (1967) one (communicative) intention encompasses the whole complex of 
intentions (1), (2) and (3). Thus, the communicative act is one which has an underlying complex 
intention. I will follow Sperber’s and Wilson’s (1995) use of the term communicative intention exclusively 
to identify intention (2), as much of the debate necessitates to identify intentions (1) and (2) as 
functionally separate though related intentions. 
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intention alone, even if successful, does not necessarily result in communication. To 
illustrate: suppose I am a guest at your party, and I would like to refill my glass. I can 
achieve this by conspicuously placing my glass in a spot you will notice.  
This action will count as an informative intention, that is, that I intend to produce a 
certain response in you by my actions. However, in this scenario, it can easily be the 
case that you don’t recognize that I have such intentions, and also that I don’t intend 
that you should (as when you don’t know it was me who put the empty glass there). 
I will still accomplish my goal, but this would not be a case of communication. For 
communication to take place, it should be overtly manifest to you that I have the 
intention to get a refill, and that I want you to be aware of such intention. In other 
words, the audience must recognize not just what one wants to communicate, but 
also that one wants to communicate. Communicative intentions (clause 2 above) 
show that the speaker is trying to communicate at all. 
Scott-Phillips relies on three closely related theses that will later help 
elucidate the points on which a weak view of Gricean communication will differ. 
The first thesis is that informative intentions are intentions to affect mental states. In other 
words, an informative intention is an intention to affect the audience behaviour by 
virtue of affecting their mental states: 
 
“An informative intention is a signaller’s intention that the receiver change 
their representation of the world in response to the signaller’s 
behaviour.” (2014, p. 25) 
 
Thus, both the expression and recognition of first-order intentions in the 
communicative act require that communicators be able to attribute mental-states to 
others, particularly states of beliefs. 
The second, related, thesis is that a communicative intention is a higher-order 
intention meant to affect the audience mental states. A higher-order mental state is one 
whose object or representation is another mental state. A communicative intention 
is a higher-order state with a nested structure, as its object is the informative 
intention: S intends to create in H a mental representation of the fact that S has the 
intention to produce a response r in H (Scott-Phillips 2014 2015; Sperber & Wilson 
1995, ch.1).  
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Combined with the first thesis, this nested structure of communicative intentions 
can be spelled out as follows (Sperber 2000): 
 
S intends that 
H should believe that 
S intends that  
H should believe that p 
 
For this reason, Gricean communication requires the ability to entertain and 
understand higher order representations of such sophisticated structure. This brings 
us to the third thesis, which assumes that both intentions are present in the same 
communicative action, that is, the same signal (Scott-Phillips 2014, p. 105). To express 
and recognize a communicative intention is, then, to simultaneously express and 
recognize an informative intention. 
Under this interpretation of Gricean communication, communicative 
intentions require a sophisticated ability for mental-state attribution and the 
expression and recognition of higher-order intentionally. Scott-Philips admits that 
there are currently no empirical studies directly targeting the comprehension of 
communicative intentions in non-human primates. Yet he remains sceptical of 
whether they might succeed. For, although there is evidence that some non-human 
primates are capable of tracking the goals and perceptual states of others, and 
perhaps entertain first-order representations, there is so far a broad consensus that 
they are not capable of entertaining a concept of belief, including false beliefs, and 
neither engage in complex nested higher-order mental states (see Call & Tomasello 
2008 for an overview; cf. Tomasello et al. 1997). Scott-Phillips concludes that non-
human primates are incapable of Gricean communicative intentions. Ape 
communication is instead a sophisticated code-based communication model, 
modelled by code-based associations, and possibly augmented by the flexibility of 
gestural signals (Scott-Phillips 2015, p. 64). 
In conclusion, the communication systems used by apes and humans are 
different in kind and not in degree, and thus have different cognitive requirements. 
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The upshot is that the origin of language in hominins must have occurred by an 
evolutionary increase in the cognitive abilities required for Gricean communication: 
mental-state attribution, particularly of belief-like states (also termed “mind-reading” 
or “theory of mind”), and inference of complex higher-order intentions.4 
However, there are some pressing concerns with the emphasis on these 
cognitive abilities, particularly on mind-reading and the understanding of higher-
order intentions. In particular, there are two worries with this emphasis. The first is 
that it may put the bar too high not only for great apes, but for human infants as 
well, who will likewise fail to communicate on a pragmatic model under the standard 
reading (Liddle & Nettle 2006; Townsend et al,. 2016). On the hypothesis that 
communication itself plays some role in the development of cognitive abilities, 
particularly in belief-attribution and in entertaining higher-order mental states, Scott-
Phillips’ view will lead to a problematic circularity, since those same abilities have 
been singled out as necessary for communication in the first place (Breheny 2006; cf. 
Davidson 1975; Dennett 1996). Secondly, it is not clear how our hominin ancestor 
developed the abilities of mind-reading without engaging in some level of 
(proto)Gricean communication. The strong Gricean model account will have to 
explain how our pre-linguistic ancestors came to possess all the cognitive abilities for 
Gricean propositional thoughts. This task seems no less demanding than explaining 
language evolution itself (see Bar-On 2013b for a similar point). Given the high 
cognitive demands imposed by standard Gricean communication, it then seems 
dubious whether the pragmatic-first approach is the best explanatory approach to 
the evolution of human language communication.  
 
Minimal model of Gricean communication 
Given these problems with the strong view, there is no lack of motivation to explore 
a suitable alternative. Richard Moore (2015, 2017; see also Townsend et al. 2016) has 
recently advanced a minimal model of Gricean communication in which the 
prerequisite cognitive abilities are weaker, and thus may lead to the development of 
the complex abilities outlined in the previous section.  
 
4 Although comparisons between humans and contemporary non-human primates do not necessarily 
carry over to comparisons with extinct species of non-human animals in our evolutionary line, nor to 
humans’ and contemporary primates’ last common ancestor (see Bar-On 2013a). 
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In brief, Moore’s model challenges the three theses identified above. I will 
first consider the arguments against the first thesis in detail. This thesis claims that 
an informative intention requires affecting H’s mental states and in particular, H’s 
beliefs. This is the standard idea (shared among others, by Bach & Harnish 1979; 
Dennett 1983; Sperber & Wilson 2002; Hurford 2007) that Gricean communication 
requires a concept of belief, and the understanding of false beliefs. A reply to the 
belief thesis can start with the claim that, in some cases, the observed behaviour of 
communicators can be described without appeal to beliefs at all. Which are these 
cases? Here it should be recalled that informative intentions, despite the terminology 
used, is a technical term which only singles out the first clause in the Gricean 
structure: what the utterer intends to accomplish with the utterance. Informative 
intentions need not be confined only to acts of conveying information. It is helpful 
to differentiate between informative acts and directive acts (already noted in Grice 
1957). The intention to affect others’ beliefs may surely be necessary for complex 
communicative acts, such as eliciting information about third parties, for example. 
However, Moore suggests that in acts of communication involving a simple range of 
directives, (e.g. “look here”, “give me the food”, “go away”, etc.), communicators 
need not comprehend the actions of others in terms of beliefs. When the speaker’s 
goal is to directly affect the audience’s behaviour, beliefs and the understanding of 
false beliefs may play no functional role. In such cases, since the object of the first-
order informative intention is to produce a behavioural response r in H, there is no 
reason to suppose that this must be only done by first affecting H’s beliefs. Instead, 
we can rethink the Gricean “informative” intention as an intention to produce a 
response in H, by virtue of affecting H’s goals or goal-directed behaviour.  
Nevertheless, this intention will require some comprehension that the 
addressee is an agent, capable of responding to the utterance. Specifically, it requires 
that communicators possess an understanding of others as subjects who act in the 
world with their own goals. On this view, the intentions involved in the Gricean 
structure can be recast in terms of goals, and in having the ability to track the goal-
directed actions of others. In a traditional conception of the intentions that underlie 
actions, including communication, to understand one’s and others’ intentions one 
must represent them as propositional attitudes, or as a combination of beliefs and 
desires (e.g. Davidson 1969), or as forming part of rational planning. On the other 
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hand, having goals and tracking the goals of others may not involve the 
representation of propositional attitudes.  
 
This modest way of understanding others in terms of their goal-directed action will 
not require attribution of a complex psychology, nor an understanding of false 
beliefs (see Butterfill and Apperly 2013).5 A creature with this minimal 
understanding of others will of course fail to comprehend communicative scenarios 
involving false beliefs. But, Moore (2017) suggests, they will be competent in many 
acts of communication which display a Gricean structure. In this manner, the 
(minimal) Gricean informative intention will not be captured in terms of beliefs, as: 
S intends that H should believe that p 
But rather as: 
S intends that H should respond with behaviour r 
In some cases, this minimal form of understanding others as agents may also require 
the ability to keep track of what others have and have not seen, and to understand 
that others’ perceptions are different than one’s own. There is mounting evidence 
that great apes, especially chimpanzees, appear capable of both abilities: understating 
the goals of others, and their perceptual perspectives (Call & Tomasello 2008; 
Tomasello 2008, ch.2). In short, Moore’s reply to the first thesis of the strong view 
depends on three claims being true. First, that intentions can be suitably cashed out 
in terms of goals, which do not involve rational planning, nor representations of 
beliefs and desire. Second, that S has the ability to track the goals of others. Third, in 
some cases, that S has the ability to track others’ perceptual states. A basic 
understanding of goal-directed action which does not require planning, nor 
representations of one’s own and other’s beliefs, is thus able to sustain a minimal 
form of intentional communication that retains the Gricean structure. In this 
manner, the assumption in the first thesis, that informative intentions are intentions to affect 
mental states, is dropped. 
 
5 When discussing Moore’s minimal model in the remainder of this paper, the terms goals and 
intentions will be used interchangeably in this minimal sense, and without involving the understating 
of beliefs, desires or rational planning.  
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The second and third theses are challenged by a further innovation in 
Moore’s model. He suggests that the two intentions constitutive of Gricean 
communication can be enacted in two separate actions.  
 
 
 
To spell this out, lets first recall the Gricean schema: 
 
(1) S intends to induce a response r in hearer H 
(2) S intends that H recognizes that S has intention (1) 
 
According to Moore, these two clauses are not necessarily always accomplished in 
the same action. Using Moore’s terms, a behaviour of “sign production” enacts the 
first clause, and a (previous) “act of address” enacts the second clause. (2017, p. 
316). This new frame directly challenges the third thesis identified above, that both 
intentions are present in the same communicative action. Moore admits this minimal model of 
separate behaviours is sufficiently but not necessarily Gricean, since it does not 
preclude that the same action can fulfil both clauses, as in the standard approach.  
As Sperber and Wilson (2002, p. 16) note, an overt behaviour “manifestly 
intended to attract the other's attention” is a pre-requisite for engaging in Gricean 
communication. In Moore’s view, an act of address is a functional pre-requisite 
towards accomplishing a communicative intention (2), since it signals that S has 
manifestly overt intentions, and that whatever follows is intended to be directed at 
H’s attention. An act of address may include attention-getting and persistence 
behaviours such as ostensive eye contact, name calling, slapping the ground or 
thumping the chest. Once S has H’s attention, a subsequent action will suffice to 
accomplish an informative intention (1). An act of address, by itself, is not 
necessarily communicative. But it will ensure that the subsequent action is 
sufficiently overt between the two subjects. The nested structure of higher-order 
states identified above can then be replaced as follows: 
 
- S intends that 
- H attend to S’s behaviour 
- S intends that 
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- H respond with behaviour r 
 
These intentions are both first order intentions, since each is elicited in two separate 
actions. In this model, the representational burden of entertaining nested higher-
order intentions and beliefs is greatly reduced. Thus, the thesis that a communicative 
intention is a higher-order intention meant to affect the audience mental states is dropped. 
To recap, Moore’s weak model of Gricean communication makes several alterations 
to the standard reading. Both informative and communicative intentions are not 
made to affect the audience’s mental states, but can be described as affecting 
behaviour without the need to do this in virtue of affecting mental representations. 
Informative and communicative intentions may not be both embedded in the same 
action or utterance. An act of address elicits a communicative intention, and the 
following signal production elicits an informative intention, in order to provoke a 
response in the audience. Communication on this minimal model will require a basic 
understanding of goal-directed action in others, and the ability to comprehend 
others’ attentional states.  
If Moore is right in dismissing the three theses of the strong model, a 
minimal model of Gricean communication may provide a suitable alternative for 
theorizing about the evolutionary development of full-blown Gricean 
communication and its sophisticated cognitive demands. However, I have some 
doubts that Moore’s model succeeds. 
Issues with a minimal Gricean framework 
In this section I raise two objections for the minimal model just outlined. If these 
objections are on target, then the minimal model is conceptually unstable: either it 
collapses into a strong version of Gricean communication, or it remains too close to 
non-Gricean code-based communication, such that it is unable to explain the 
development of communicative acts beyond a fixed and limited set of directive 
actions. 
The first objection starts from Scott-Phillips’ (2015, p. 76) observation that a 
description of first-order intentions in terms of intentions to affect behaviour is too 
broad, in that it encompasses some behaviours that are clearly not communicative. 
To use an example of Scott-Phillips’, suppose I say “Stop hitting me” and at the 
same time move away from you to a place where you cannot hit me. In this case 
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both actions can affect your behaviour, even though only the first is communicative. 
We can distinguish communication from different social behaviours only in terms of 
intentions to affect representational mental states. Scott-Phillips’ objection relies on 
the assumption that understanding belief or belief-like states is a necessary condition 
of Gricean communication. This is the first thesis of the strong model and, as we 
have seen, a proponent of the minimal model can overcome this assumption by 
focusing on a limited set of directives, availing of the notion of goal-attribution, and 
appealing to the interplay of an act of address and an act of signal production. 
However, I think there is a way to recast Scott-Phillips’ objection that meets the 
proponent of the minimal model on her own ground. 
The problem arises from the minimal model’s stipulation that the nested 
structure of communicative intentions can be broken down into separate acts. The 
key question is whether we can account for the connection between these acts in a 
way that can still allow us to distinguish communicative from non-communicative 
behaviours. For example, in trying to get you to stop hitting me, I could engage your 
attention through ostensive eye contact, and then move away to a place where you 
cannot hit me. Even if the informative intention, if there is actually one, is preceded 
by an act of address to engage the audience attention, this is not a case of 
communication. Yet it seems to satisfy the minimal Gricean view. The problem here 
is that there is no principled connection between the act of address and the 
subsequent behaviour meant to elicit an informative intention. 
Attention-getting acts, including persistence and elaboration of a gesture by 
tracking the audience response, for example, may indicate that S understands that H 
is an agent with his or her own goals. But having the goal to get the audience’s 
attention is not necessarily the same thing as having the goal to make it overt to the 
audience that one has an informative intention. Similarly, acts of address also do not 
guarantee that H will make the inference that the following signal is one of 
communication. It will be necessary to establish that both S and H can comprehend 
the connection between the two (or more) actions corresponding each to the 
expression of a communicative intention and the expression of an informative 
intention. In order to spell out a suitable connection between these acts, we can 
amend Moore’s formulation above as follows: 
 
S intends that 
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H should attend to S’s gesture and thereby recognize (be able to track) that 
S intends that  
H should respond with behaviour r 
 
This formulation can capture the insight of the original Gricean schema while 
preserving some elements of Moore’s minimal model. In this way, even if 
communicative and informative intentions are performed by different acts, both H 
and S should be aware of that these two acts are suitably connected. However, this 
requires reintroducing higher-order states in the picture. In short, the minimal model 
collapses back into a stronger version of Gricean communication, as it necessitates 
the more sophisticated cognitive capacities to express and infer higher-order states. 
The second objection to the minimal model concerns the shift from mind-
reading abilities to abilities of recognizing goal-oriented behaviour. The weak model 
of communicative intentionality does have the advantage that it posits lower 
cognitive requirements for communication which are perhaps shared by adult 
humans, infants and non-human apes, something which indicates that an 
evolutionary difference of degree may be at play in the phylogeny of language. The 
pressing difficulty, however, is that these proto-Gricean conditions, and lower 
cognitive requirements, might not be enough to support the minimal model of 
communication, as opposed to merely a code-base communication.  
As noted, in the minimal model Gricean communication requires making 
inferences about a speaker’s goals. One could hold that making inferences of 
complex communicative goals do require inferential knowledge of others’ mental 
states (Tomasello 2008, ch.1; Bar-On 2013b). Moore replies to this objection by 
limiting the model’s applicability to simple communicative goals. This limited range 
of simple goals can include basic directives: producing a signal to initiate play, 
request food or grooming.6 Thus, the requisites for a minimal mode of Gricean 
communication are that communicators be able “entertain and identify in others 
only a limited range of goal-directed behaviours” (Moore 2017, p. 324). Moreover, 
according to Moore, a limited set communicative goals can only be used when 
utterances are used in fixed and predictable ways. The concern about a set of 
utterances that is fixed, predictable and limited to certain environmental conditions, 
 
6 Cf. Tomasello’s observation that apes’ gestural communication “is aimed exclusively at making 
demands/requests” (2008, p. 332). 
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is that an inflexible system is probably not a Gricean system, neither strong nor 
minimal, even when we do away with the requirement of belief attribution. 
Liebal et al. (2013, p. 187) define functional flexibility of signals in the 
literature of non-human primate communication as “the production of a single 
signal across a variety of functional contexts and the production of several signals in 
the same functional context.” Functional flexibility is one characteristic of human 
infant vocalizations (Tomasello et al. 2005; Oller et al. 2005).  
Similarly, there is growing evidence and studies that show that some species of non-
human primates display functional flexibility in communication (Liebal et al. 2013; 
Ackermann et al. 2014; Clay et al. 2015). This evidence suggests that non-human 
primates’ communicative system is flexible when involving simple goals. The key 
question here is whether this limited functional flexibility implies that 
communicators make inferences according to the Gricean structure. I suggest that it 
does not.  
We have seen that it is useful to distinguish between directive acts and 
informative acts in communication. Ideally, however, we should be able to sketch a 
Gricean framework that can encompass both, or at least account for the transition 
from directives to informative acts. The transition from simple goals involving a 
limited range of directives, to more complex ones involving intentional 
communicative goals to share information, is still to be explained. This transition is 
not as straightforward as it may seem at first.  
In this respect, Tomasello (2014) makes a distinction between 
communication of demands, and the intentional communication of cooperative 
information. On this view, the transition from minimal to strong Gricean 
communication may be understood as a transition from simple goal-directed 
behaviour aimed to make requests and demands, to the complex behaviour of 
intentionally sharing cooperative information. In this transition, the attribution of 
communicative goals to others may not be a simple cognitive ability, as Moore 
seems to presuppose.  
In order to share information, communicators will have to intentionally 
express their goals, and their audience will have to suitably infer not just what those 
goals are, but also what they are meant to inform. For example, suppose that S 
wants to communicate to H that there are tubers they can dig under a certain spot in 
the ground. In order achieve this goal, S can get H’s attention, via an act of address, 
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and then point (or perform any other suitable action, such as stumping her feet on 
the spot) to lead H’s perception toward the correct spot on the ground. Concerning 
S this situation could perhaps count as an instance of a minimal Gricean 
communicative act conveying information.7 But it is not clear that H is a similar 
Gricean communicator. To count as one, H will have to infer that S’s goal is to look 
at the ground and infer that S’s goal is to make H realize that by looking at the 
ground H will understand that that there are tubers they can dig in that spot.  
Moore seems to suggest that H need not understand that this is in fact S’s goal. It is 
only required that H be suitably affected to look at the correct spot in the ground. 
But the problem here is that, as there is no understanding of intentions involved, it 
is implausible to say that H understands what the reference of S’s signal is: the 
tubers under the ground. In this scenario, it suffices that H’s behaviour is 
manipulated by certain basic associations (stomping of feet, looking at that spot in 
the ground, etc.). These associations do not necessarily involve grasping S’s 
communicative goal, let alone S’s information that there are tubers under the 
ground. In contrast, H’s role may be equally accounted for in terms of a 
sophisticated code-based communication model. 
In short, a minimal Gricean framework will have to provide a richer account 
of the cognitive requirements for communicative goal-attribution and inference.  
However, this seems to put us back where we left Scott-Phillips: the worry is that 
the cognitive demands of Gricean communication are such that it is hard to see how 
they evolved from a code-based system. 
 
Conclusion 
In the strong view of Gricean communication, three assumptions can be identified. 
First, informative intentions involve affecting mental states, particularly beliefs, and 
thus require a sophisticated ability of attributing mental states to others. Second, 
communicative intentions are higher-order intentions. Third, informative and 
communicative intentions are understood as united within a sole complex intention 
present in a single communicative action. In contrast, a weak framework of 
communicative intentions does away with these three assumptions. Intentions are 
described in terms of goal-directed actions to affect the behaviours and goals of 
 
7 Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the first objection above does not hold. 
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others. Communicative intentions are performed by overt acts of address that serve 
to get the audience’s attention and may be separate from the signal itself. I have 
argued that this separation of communicative and informative intentions as enacted 
in two different actions is problematic, unless communicators are able to grasp the 
connection between the acts in a principled manner. But this brings us back to a 
strong version of Gricean communication involving higher-order mental states. 
One important feature in the minimal conception of Gricean 
communication is that expressing and inferring intentions involves only the tracking 
of goal-directed behaviour in oneself and others. Of course, such a shift brings its 
own problems.  
At least on the current formulation of the minimal model, it is not clear that tracking 
goal-oriented behaviours can support pragmatic communicative acts and avoid 
collapsing into a version of the code model. If this difficulty holds, the minimal 
Gricean model is not a preferable alternative, and we are back at the problems that 
beset Scott-Phillips’ strong Gricean model, including the need to explain the 
evolutionary gap between code-based systems and full-fledged Gricean systems. 
We seem to be left with two options. We can accept something along the 
lines of Scott-Phillips’ view, and admit that the best way forward is to identify the 
emergent development of sophisticated mind-reading competence without appealing 
to language-use. Or we can abandon the project of providing a pragmatic-first 
approach to the emergence of language in phylogeny. Instead, I will briefly suggest a 
third option. We can adopt some of the innovations of Moore’s minimal model, 
such as the emphasis on the ability to understand the goals and perceptual states of 
others. This minimal understanding of other minds fails to support a Gricean 
communication system. Yet the analysis of intentions in terms of this minimal 
understanding is nevertheless compatible with non-Gricean alternatives to language 
development which take into account the cognitive import of expressive behaviours 
and affective cues (Bar-On 2013b; Green 2007). In fact, these accounts may be 
complementary, and a more pluralistic approach may constitute a third option for 
progress in language evolution. 
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